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Self-Love and Neighbor-Love in Kierkegaard’s Ethics

ANTONY AUMANN

Abstract

Kierkegaard faces a dilemma. On the one hand, he endorses the biblical command to
love our neighbors as ourselves. As such, he thinks self-love and neighbor-love
should be symmetrical, similar in kind as well as degree. On the other hand, he
recommends relating to others and ourselves differently. We are to be lenient,
charitable, and forgiving when dealing with others; the opposite when dealing with
ourselves. To resolve this tension, I argue that being more stringent with ourselves is
not a moral ideal for Kierkegaard. It is a gambit designed to rehabilitate us from our
tendency toward the opposite extreme.

Introduction

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claims the virtuous person regards a friend as
“another self.” 1 He thereby implies love for one’s friends and for oneself should be
more or less symmetrical, similar in kind as well as degree. 2 A comparable idea, but
with expanded scope, arises in the well-known biblical directive to “love your
neighbor as yourself.” 3 It too suggests we should love others and ourselves in roughly
equal fashion. 4

1

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1166a30-1166a32. See also Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 1245a291245a30; Pseudo-Aristotle, Magna Moralia 1213a11-1213a13.
2
Julia Annas, “Self-Love in Aristotle,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 27, no. S1, 1989, pp.
1-18.
3
Lv 19:18. The idea is central to all three Abrahamic faiths. Rabbi Hillel says the injunction to love
your neighbor as yourself summarizes the Torah (b. Shabbat 31a). Jesus declares the saying
encapsulates the teachings of the Law and the Prophets (Mt 7:12; cf. Mk 12:31). Finally, several hadith

2
Certain strands of ethical thought, often Christian in origin, reject this notion. 5
They foreswear symmetry between self-love and neighbor-love. We are to love our
neighbors more. As various scriptural passages aver, we ought to consider other
people better than ourselves and judge them less harshly. 6 We should willingly serve
them—even lay down our lives for them. 7
Both traditions find expression in Søren Kierkegaard’s work. On the one hand,
he embraces the “as” of the famous commandment. He insists we should love
ourselves the same way we do our neighbors. 8 On the other hand, he recommends
relating to others and ourselves in disparate fashions. We should be lenient,
charitable, and forgiving when dealing with others; the opposite when dealing with
ourselves. A “heightened inequality” exists here, he declares. 9
How do these two positions fit together? My aim is to solve this puzzle. I
begin by exploring its nuances, including the specific way it arises in Kierkegaard’s
writings. I then consider handling it by appealing to Gene Outka’s idea that equal love
does not entail identical treatment. After rejecting this solution, I offer my own:
Asymmetry between self-love and neighbor-love is not a moral ideal for Kierkegaard
but a rehabilitative strategy. He counsels us to be more latitudinarian with others than

collections quote Muhammad as making analogous proclamations (Sahih Bukhari, bk. 2, no. 12; Sahih
Muslim, bk. 1, no. 72). See Oddbjørn Leirvik, “Aw qāla: ‘Li-jārihi’: Some Observations on
Brotherhood and Neighborly Love in Islamic Tradition,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol.
21, no. 4, 2010, pp. 357-372.
4
Equal regard for all people is often seen as the crux of the love commandment. See Stephen J. Pope,
“‘Equal Regard’ versus ‘Special Relations’? Reaffirming the Inclusiveness of Agape,” The Journal of
Religion, vol. 77, no. 3,1997, p. 353; Gene Outka, Agape: An Ethical Analysis, New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press 1977, pp. 9-24.
5
For canonical Christian defenses of this position, see Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans. by
Philip S. Watson, Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press 1953; Richard Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny
of Man, 2 vols., New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons 1949; Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics,
Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press 1950. For a secular defense, see W. G. Maclagan, “Self
and Others: A Defence of Altruism,” The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 15, 1954, pp. 109-127.
6
Mt 7:1-5; Lk 6:42; Rm 2:1; Ph 2:3-4; Jm 4:12.
7
Jn 15:13; Ph 2:5-8; 1 Jn 3:16.
8
SKS 9, 30 / WL, 23.
9
SKS 9, 375 / WL, 382.
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with ourselves in order to correct against a common tendency toward the opposite
extreme.

I. Proper and Improper Self-Love

Self-love is subject to a range of value judgments. 10 Some have seen it as a positive
thing. Aristotle considered self-esteem beneficial for the good of friendship. 11
Augustine regarded concern for one’s own true good as the cornerstone of Christian
life. 12 By contrast, others have viewed self-love as something negative. John Calvin
called it a noxious pest. 13 Anders Nygren thought people should rid themselves of it
entirely. 14
We must not trivialize this dispute, as it often reflects deeper disagreements.
But to some degree the quarrel is merely verbal. We go a long way toward resolving it
if we draw a distinction, found already in Aristotle but present also in Kierkegaard,
between proper and improper self-love. 15 Condemnations of self-love usually concern
10

As Thomas Aquinas says, “In one sense self-love is something all men have in common; in another it
is something peculiar to the good; and in still another, something peculiar to the wicked” (Summa
Theologiae, vol. 34, ed. and trans. By R. J. Batten O.P., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006,
II-II, q. 25, a. 7). For more robust taxonomies, see Oliver O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St.
Augustine, Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers 2006, pp. 1-9; Outka, Agape, pp. 55-74; Edward
Collins Vacek S. J., Love, Human and Divine: The Heart of Christian Ethics, Washington, D. C.:
Georgetown University Press 1994, pp. 205-208; Darlene Fozard Weaver, Self Love and Christian
Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002, pp. 47-77.
11
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 1240a4-1240b37.
12
See, e.g., Augustine, City of God, trans. by Henry Bettenson, New York: Penguin Books 1984, sec.
XIX.14; Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, trans. by D. W. Robertson, Jr., Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice Hall 1958, sec. I.26.27. See also O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine, pp.
37-59.
13
John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. by Henry Beveridge, London: Bonham
Norton 1599, bk. III.7.4.
14
Agape and Eros, pp. 100f. and pp. 130-132. Nygren’s basic position has become commonplace. As
Harry Frankfurt notes, many consider self-love entirely pernicious because it “makes it impossible for
us to devote ourselves sufficiently and in a suitable way…to other things that we love or that it would
be good for us to love” (The Reasons of Love, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2006, p. 71).
15
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1168b10-1169a17. See SKS 9, 26 / WL, 18. SKS 9, 30f. / WL, 22f.
SKS 9, 59f. / WL, 53. SKS 9, 152 / WL, 151. See M. Jamie Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving: A
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its improper form, what we associate with selfishness, self-centeredness, and pride. 16
Affirmations of self-love typically have to do with its proper form, what we connect
inter alia with having a healthy regard for one’s own well-being or considering
oneself to be of intrinsic moral value. 17
The distinction between proper and improper self-love bears on my project.
There is no problem for Kierkegaard if he advocates asymmetry between neighborlove and improper self-love. Of course we are not to love our neighbor as we do
ourselves when we love ourselves wrongly; we are to love our neighbor as we do
ourselves when we love ourselves rightly. A difficulty arises for Kierkegaard, then,
only if he promotes asymmetry between neighbor-love and proper self-love.
Accordingly, I will focus my attention here.

II. Asymmetry between Self-Love and Neighbor-Love

At the most abstract level, I have no argument with Kierkegaard. He construes proper
self-love as promotion of one’s own true good. He identifies this good with love of

Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001, pp. 31-36; M.
Jamie Ferreira, “The Problematic Agapeistic Ideal—Again,” in Ethics, Love, and Faith in Kierkegaard,
ed. by Edward F. Mooney, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 2008, pp. 97f.; M. Jamie
Ferreira, “Rethinking Hatred of Self: A Kierkegaardian Exploration,” in Why Kierkegaard Matters: A
Festschrift in Honor of Robert L. Perkins, ed. by Marc A. Jolley and Edmon L. Rowell Jr., Macon, GA:
Mercer University Press 2010, pp. 124-127; Sharon Krishek, Kierkegaard on Faith and Love,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009, pp. 115-118; John Lippitt, “True Self-Love and True
Self-Sacrifice,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 66, no. 3, 2009, pp. 125-138.
16
Lippitt, “True Self-Love and True Self-Sacrifice,” pp. 127-129; Outka, Agape, pp. 56-63. Some
refuse to categorize selfishness and the like as even corrupted self-love; see Robert Merrihew Adams,
“Self-Love and the Vices of Self-Preference,” Faith and Philosophy, vol. 15, no. 4, 1998, pp. 502-509;
Erich Fromm, “Selfishness and Self-Love,” Psychiatry, vol. 2, no. 4, 1939, pp. 520f.
17
See Ferreira, “Rethinking Hatred of Self: A Kierkegaardian Exploration,” pp. 124-126, 129; Fromm,
“Selfishness and Self-Love,” p. 520; O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine, pp. 2-4;
Outka, Agape, pp. 63-74; Weaver, Self Love and Christian Ethics, pp. 56-61.
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God. 18 Similarly, he describes proper neighbor-love as promotion of the neighbor’s
true good, which he also equates with love of God. He asserts, “To love God is to love
oneself truly; to help another person to love God is to love another person; to be
helped by another person to love God is to be loved.” 19
Interestingly, Kierkegaard adds that God does not ask anything for himself.
God requests that we express love for Him by caring for our fellow human beings:

A person should begin with loving the unseen, God…. But that he actually loves the unseen
will be known by his loving the brother he sees…. If you want to show that your life is
intended to serve God, then let it serve people…. God does not have a share in existence in
such a way that he asks for his share for himself; he asks for everything, but as you bring it
to him you immediately receive, if I may put it this way, a notice designating where it should
be delivered further, because God does not ask for anything for himself.

20

What this means is that promoting someone’s true good does not merely
involve building up his or her religious virtues. It consists in helping the person
cultivate his or her moral character as well. Of course, this point holds for self and
neighbor alike. As yet, then, we find no asymmetry between self-love and neighborlove in Kierkegaard’s ethics.
The problem I have in mind comes into focus when we think about the matter
more concretely. How in particular are we to go about promoting our own welfare?
18

SKS 9, 111 / WL, 107. See also SKS 5, 297 / EUD, 303. SKS 10, 198f. / CD, 188f. Here Kierkegaard
falls in line with the classical tradition of Christian eudaemonism. For accounts of Christian
eudaemonism, see O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine, pp. 37-59; Weaver, Self
Love and Christian Ethics, pp. 3-4. For interpretations of Kierkegaard as a eudaemonist, see Gregory
R. Beabout and Brad Frazier, “A Challenge to the ‘Solitary Self’ Interpretation of Kierkegaard,”
History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 1, 2000, pp. 75-98; C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard’s
Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, pp.
182f. For an attack on eudaemonist readings of Kierkegaard, see Ronald M. Green, Kierkegaard and
Kant: The Hidden Debt, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press 1992, pp. 100f.
19
SKS 9, 111 / WL, 107. See also SKS 9, 113 / WL, 109. SKS 9, 118 / WL, 114. SKS 9, 124 / WL, 121.
See also Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love, pp. 182-184.
20
SKS 9, 161 / WL, 160f.; see Jn 21:15-17.
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And how exactly should we tackle the project of furthering the neighbor’s good? As
we shall see, Kierkegaard answers these two questions in divergent ways. 21

II.A. Loving Our Neighbor

Kierkegaard’s most robust account of how to relate to our neighbors occurs in Works
of Love. He first and foremost recommends adopting an optimistic attitude: We ought
to believe the best about people. We should assume they act out of concern for others,
not mere self-interest. He writes, “Love builds up by presupposing that love is
present.” 22 And elsewhere: “But what, then, is love? Love is to presuppose love; to
have love is to presuppose love in others; to be loving is to presuppose that others are
loving.” 23
Kierkegaard also exhorts us to undertake the complementary task of
disregarding others’ moral and religious failings. 24 He draws a disanalogy between
the mindset we must have and that of the criminal detective. 25 The detective operates
with a hermeneutics of suspicion. He or she hunts down clues of people’s
wrongdoing, inspecting whether even apparently insignificant things disclose sinister
behavior. 26 Our assignment, by contrast, is to ignore the potential guilt or sinfulness

21

The asymmetry I find here is related but distinct from the one Theodor Adorno famously addresses.
Adorno criticizes Kierkegaard for eschewing reciprocity, for calling us to love others whether or not
they love us in return. Thus, he focuses on the asymmetry between how we treat others and how they
treat us. My focus is the asymmetry between how we treat others and how we treat ourselves. See
Theodor W. Adorno, “On Kierkegaard’s Doctrine of Love,” Studies in Philosophy and Social Science,
vol. 8, no. 3, 1939, pp. 413-429. For a response to Adorno’s criticism, see M. Jamie Ferreira,
“Asymmetry and Self-Love: The Challenge to Reciprocity and Equality,” Kierkegaard Studies
Yearbook, 1998, pp. 41-59; Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving, pp. 209-227.
22
SKS 9, 225 / WL, 222; emphasis in the original.
23
SKS 9, 225 / WL, 223.
24
SKS 5, 70 / EUD, 60. SKS 9, 280 / WL, 282. SKS 12, 295 / WA, 181.
25
SKS 9, 289-292 / WL, 291-294.
26
Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving, p. 169 and p. 173.
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of our neighbors. 27 We should not simply wait to pick out the proverbial splinters in
others’ eyes until we have removed the logs from our own. 28 We should not even look
for the splinters. Kierkegaard quips, “The log in your own eye is neither more nor less
than seeing and condemning the splinter in your brother’s eye.” 29
Of course, sometimes it proves difficult to presuppose love in others and to
overlook their transgressions. Kierkegaard’s guiding maxim in these situations is
“love hides a multitude of sins.” 30 Several strategies fall under this heading. One is to
furnish mitigating explanations for our neighbor’s behavior, to interpret his or her
words and actions in the best possible light. Hopefully we will thereby come to view
any given misdeed as less of one, or not one at all. 31 Should this procedure become
untenable in practice, we must simply forgive the person. 32 “The mitigating
explanation wrests something away from the multitude by showing that this and that
were not sin. Forgiveness removes what cannot be denied to be sin. Thus love strives
in every way to hide a multitude of sins; but forgiveness is the most notable way.” 33

II.B. Loving Ourselves

27

See SKS 7, 291-295 / CUP1, 320-323.
See Mt 7:3-5; Lk 6:41-42.
29
SKS 9, 375 / WL, 382. See Ferreira, “Asymmetry and Self-Love,” p. 55.
30
SKS 9, 286 / WL, 289; 1 P 4:7-12. For other discussions of how “love hides a multitude of sins,” see
SKS 5, 65-77 / EUD, 55-68. SKS 5, 78-86 / EUD, 69-78. SKS 12, 293-302 / WA, 179-188.
31
SKS 9, 289-292 / WL, 291-294
32
SKS 9, 291-294 / WL, 294-297. Forgiving someone makes sense when we are ones who have been
injured. It is out of order when the action harms a third party. I can properly forgive only harms
inflicted upon me. Thus, when faced with a transgression against a third party for which we cannot
supply a mitigating explanation, another tactic Kierkegaard recommends becomes appropriate, namely
remaining silent (SKS 9, 286-289 / WL, 289-291). Admittedly, refusing to speak up in such situations
also sometimes seems wrong. I address this point in section VII.
33
SKS 9, 291f. / WL, 294.
28
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When it comes to loving ourselves, Kierkegaard backs an entirely different approach.
We should not work toward our true good—our moral and religious perfection—by
being optimistic about ourselves. We ought not to presuppose the best: selfless
motivations and altruistic agendas. We must proceed pessimistically, constantly
doubting our moral and religious prowess. “Earnestness,” Kierkegaard declares, “is
precisely this kind of honest distrust of oneself, to treat oneself as a suspicious
character.” 34
As the preceding quotation suggests, the analogy to criminal investigation is
once more in play. But Kierkegaard adopts the opposite position this time around. He
embraces it:

Guilty? Not guilty? This is the earnest question in legal proceedings. This same question is
even more earnest in concern about oneself, for if the authorities force their way into the
most hidden nooks of the house in order to apprehend the guilty person, concern about
oneself forces its way further than any judge does in order to find the guilt, into the heart’s
most secret nook.

35

The thrust of this passage is that, rather than willfully ignoring our own
wrongdoings, we should seek them out. We must struggle to become aware of our
guilt and conscious of our sins. 36 In a sense, Kierkegaard’s entire authorship
underscores this ideal. He ceaselessly prods us to examine the purity of our hearts, the
selflessness of our loves, and the unconditionality of our devotion to God.

34

SKS 13, 70 / FSE, 44.
SKS 8, 363 / UD, 266.
36
E.g. SKS 5, 397 / TD, 15. SKS 12, 263-266 / WA, 150-153. For discussions of guilt- and sinconsciousness in Kierkegaard’s writings, see Amy Laura Hall, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002, pp. 3f. and pp. 11-22; David J. Kangas, “The Very
Opposite of Beginning With Nothing: Guilt Consciousness in Kierkegaard’s ‘The Gospel of
Sufferings’ IV,” in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. by Robert L. Perkins, Macon, GA:
Mercer University Press 2005 (The International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 15), pp. 287-313.
35
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How ought we to respond upon discovering our own moral and religious
shortcomings? Kierkegaard’s advice could hardly depart more from what he says
about handling the failings of others. “Hiding a multitude of sins” has no place here,
and the strategies used to do so are prohibited. Forgiveness constitutes a striking
example. We may and indeed must forgive others, but never ourselves:

It is not unjust for you to forgive another person for his sake if he asks for your forgiveness,
or if you believe that he wishes it for God’s sake, who requires it, or for your own sake, so
you may not be disturbed…. Neither are you defrauding God of what belongs to him if you
sell forgiveness for nothing; you are not wasting your time or misusing it if you ponder what
may well serve as an excuse; and if no excuse is to be found you are not deceived if
you…believe that the offense must be excusable. But when it is a matter of your own
accounting, then you certainly would do wrong to forgive yourself the least little thing,
because one’s own righteousness is even worse than one’s own blackest private guilt.

37

[J]ust as the sensate man is distinguishable by his seeing the speck in his brother’s eye but
not seeing the log in his own, by rigorously condemning the same fault in others that he
lightly forgives in himself, so the mark of a more profound and concerned person is that he
judges himself most rigorously, uses all his ingenuity to excuse another person but is unable
to excuse himself, indeed is convinced that the other one is more excusable.

38

To summarize, Kierkegaard’s accounts of self-love and neighbor-love are
symmetrical when considered abstractly. The task in both cases is to promote the true
good of the person in question. However, when Kierkegaard explains in concrete
detail what it means to carry out these projects, we encounter asymmetry. He
recommends treating others with leniency and charity, ourselves with stringency and

37
38

SKS 5, 393f. / TD, 12.
SKS 5, 328 / EUD, 340. But cf. SKS 9, 373 / WL, 380. SKS 12, 30f. / PC, 20. SKS 12, 295 / WA, 181.
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suspicion. The question I will pursue in what follows is whether such disparate
treatment is consistent with loving our neighbor as ourselves.

III. Equal Regard, Not Identical Treatment

The puzzle here resembles another. On the one hand, Christian interpretations of the
love commandment often construe “the neighbor” as anyone whatsoever. 39 The term
refers not just to those in physical proximity. Its extension includes acquaintances,
strangers, friends, and enemies. In addition, the commandment is usually taken to
imply not merely that we must love all those who fall into these categories but that we
must love them in the same way, namely as we love ourselves. In short, we should
have equal regard for everyone. 40
On the other hand, most Christian traditions preserve a place for so-called
“special relationships,” such as those obtaining between friends and family members.
These bonds are celebrated rather than disparaged or abolished. Moreover,
Christianity tends not to demand we treat those in our inner circles just as we do
strangers and enemies. Different attitudes and responses are permitted here.
The tension between requiring equal love for everyone and making room for
special relationships crops up in Kierkegaard’s writings. 41 On the one hand, he

39

O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine, p. 121; Gene Outka, “Universal Love and
Impartiality,” in The Love Commandments: Essays in Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy, ed. by
Edmund N. Santurri and William Werpehowski, Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press
1992, pp. 6-10. For an attack on this reading of the love commandment, see Oswald Hanfling, “Loving
My Neighbour, Loving Myself,” Philosophy, vol. 68, no. 264, 1993, pp. 145-148.
40
This interpretation is sometimes bolstered by appealing to the notion that all people possess equal
value in virtue of their common humanity and thus deserve the same love. See SKS 9, 64-67 / WL, 5860; Outka, Agape, pp. 9-24; Outka, “Universal Love and Impartiality,” pp. 6-12; Pope, “‘Equal Regard’
versus ‘Special Relations’?,” pp. 353-356.
41
See Joseph Carlsmith, “Essentially Preferential: A Critique of Kierkegaard’s Works of Love,”
Gnosis, vol. 12, no. 1, 2011, pp. 15-29; Ferreira, “Asymmetry and Self-Love”; Ferreira, Love’s
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criticizes the introduction of preferentiality into our dealings with others; he claims
we should draw no distinctions between people. 42 On the other hand, he refuses to do
away with the quintessentially preferential relationships of marriage and friendship.
Indeed, he explicitly affirms them. 43
Gene Outka develops what has become a canonical response to this problem.
He distinguishes between equal regard for all people and identical treatment of
them. 44 The love commandment, as he interprets it, requires only the former. Yes, we
must view everyone as possessing the same intrinsic moral value. We must care about
them for their own sake, not just for the sake of any benefits they may provide us.
However, we do not have to act in precisely the same way toward each and every
individual.
Outka marshals two compelling considerations in favor of his view. First,
because we are finite creatures, we cannot treat everyone the same. 45 There are simply
too many people in the world, and most of them reside outside our sphere of
influence. Second, behaving the same toward everyone would be obtuse. Responding
indiscriminately to the hungry, the naked, and the sick would be bizarrely insensitive.
A prudent love responds variously according to the specific circumstances of those it
encounters. 46

Grateful Striving, pp. 43-52; Ferreira, “The Problematic Agapeistic Ideal—Again”; Krishek,
Kierkegaard on Faith and Love, chap. 4; John Lippitt, “Cracking the Mirror: On Kierkegaard’s
Concerns about Friendship,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 61, no. 3, 2007, pp.
131-150; Sylvia Walsh, “Forming the Heart: The Role of Love in Kierkegaard’s Thought,” in The
Grammar of the Heart: New Essays in Moral Philosophy and Theology, ed. by Richard H. Bell, New
York: Harper and Row 1988, pp. 234-256. For a more general discussion of the issue, see Outka,
Agape, pp. 268-274.
42
SKS 9, 27 / WL, 19. SKS 9, 51 / WL, 44. SKS 9, 61 / WL, 55. SKS 9, 64 / WL, 58. SKS 9, 69f. / WL,
63. See Krishek, Kierkegaard on Faith and Love, pp. 113-129.
43
SKS 9, 69 / WL, 62. SKS 9, 145f. / WL, 143-145.
44
Agape, p. 10, pp. 19-21, pp. 90f., and p. 269. For a precursor to Outka’s distinction, see Aquinas,
Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 26, a. 6.
45
Agape, p. 269. See also Pope, “‘Equal Regard’ versus ‘Special Relations’?,” p. 368.
46
Agape, pp. 19-21 and pp. 90f.
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We can use Outka’s insights to try to validate the asymmetry between selflove and neighbor-love Kierkegaard advocates. 47 But we have our work cut out for us.
Outka’s position does not legitimize any and every difference in treatment. The
obligation to regard everyone equally remains in place and installs constraints: We
cannot interact with people however we please. Disparities in attitude and behavior
cannot be based on idiosyncratic preference or aversion. They must be grounded in
morally salient differences between the cases. 48

IV. Differences between Others and Ourselves

Several differences might justify being more latitudinarian with others than with
ourselves. Two in particular seem promising. First, Kierkegaard often hints we know
ourselves better than we know others. 49 We lack access to other people’s minds. Their
motivations and intentions remain forever obscure to us. By contrast, we can know
our own minds. It is possible for us to become aware of what drives us to do what we
do.
This difference matters because, like Kant, Kierkegaard locates moral and
religious value in an action’s originating motivations. 50 He considers a deed

47

Given that Outka and others find the distinction between identical treatment and equal regard in
Kierkegaard’s writings, this strategy seems fitting. Outka, Agape, p. 20. See also Evans, Kierkegaard’s
Ethic of Love, pp. 198-202; Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving, pp. 112f. For criticisms of this reading
of Kierkegaard, see Carlsmith, “Essentially Preferential”; Krishek, Kierkegaard on Faith and Love, pp.
122-129.
48
Outka, “Universal Love and Impartiality,” p. 11; Pope, “‘Equal Regard’ versus ‘Special Relations’?,”
p. 362.
49
SKS 5, 68 / EUD, 58. SKS 5, 328 / EUD, 340. SKS 5, 410 / TD, 31. SKS 7, 132 / CUP1, 141f. SKS 7,
288-295 / CUP1, 316-324. SKS 9, 230f. / WL, 228f. SKS 10, 244 / CD, 237. Cf. Outka, Agape, pp.
305f.
50
See, e.g., SKS 7, 125-127 / CUP1, 134-136.
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meritorious if and only if it is done out of love. 51 It follows that we are not in position
to form reliable judgments about the moral and religious standing of others. The only
evidence at our disposal is observations and reports of what people say and do. But
these data underdetermine the issue. Kierkegaard believes any action can be
performed and any statement can be uttered out of love or its opposite. He explicitly
says that “there is nothing, no ‘thus and so,’ that can unconditionally be said to
demonstrate unconditionally the presence of love or to demonstrate unconditionally
its absence.” 52 Johannes Climacus draws the conclusion for us: “Scripture teaches:
‘Judge not, that you be not judged.’ This is said as an admonition and warning, but it
is also an impossibility. One person cannot ethically judge another.” 53
Judging ourselves is another kettle of fish. We can know what led us to say
and do what we have said and done. 54 Of course, introspection sometimes goes awry
and the danger of self-deception is never far off. Still, in principle, we have access to
our own motivations. So moral and religious assessment of our own words and deeds
is potentially felicitous in a way it is not when it comes to others. 55
Second, Kierkegaard thinks we have different duties and responsibilities
toward ourselves than toward others. 56 Most notably, each person is responsible only
for his or her own ethical and religious development. As we read in Purity of Heart,
“How you act and the responsibility for it is finally wholly and solely yours as an
individual.” 57
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The reasoning here is straightforward. It is a structural feature of agency that
some things we can only do for ourselves. 58 Only I can perform my own actions or
think my own thoughts. More significantly, only I can adopt the moral good or
communion with God as my ultimate end. 59 Since no one can do these things on my
behalf, no one besides me can be responsible for them. Following Kant, Kierkegaard
maintains we can be responsible only for that over which we have control. 60
Of course, Kierkegaard believes we can help others do things for themselves.
We can even aid them with important tasks such as loving their neighbors or cleaving
to God. Indeed, we should. 61 But any duties here are qualified by a further obligation
to respect others’ autonomy. People have the right to make decisions free from any
push we might wish to give them toward one option rather than another. 62 Therefore,
we are morally required to keep our distance from those we assist. We must allow
them to go their own way or, in Kierkegaard’s words, “to stand alone.” 63
Given all these considerations, it seems fitting to focus more attention on our
own moral and religious development. Even the rhetorical flourish Kierkegaard adds
at this point does not appear unreasonable:

In order that all the power and the attention of mind…can be concentrated in the service of
earnestness, it is of service to you…that you come to feel the full weight of the truth that it is
you who alone are assigned to yourself, have nothing, nothing at all, to do with others, but
have all the more, or rather, everything to do with yourself.
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V. Destabilizing the Differences

We thus have a prima facie case for treating ourselves and others differently.
However, it fails to withstand closer scrutiny.
Take the first point, that we know ourselves better than we know others. It is
true we lack certainty about the contents of other minds. But should we really be more
confident about the contents of our own? Although Kierkegaard fails to give a
consistent answer to this question, he quite often says “no.” 65 In Three Discourses on
Imagined Occasions, he asserts that our intentions are always somewhat hazy to us. 66
He repeats the claim in Christian Discourses: “Alas, who does know himself! Is it not
exactly this to which the earnest and honest self-examination finally leads as its last
and truest, this humble confession: ‘Who knows his errors? From my hidden faults
cleanse thou me’ (Psalm 19:12).” 67
More generally, Kierkegaard’s persistent worries about self-deception make
sense only if he thinks self-transparency is a problem. 68 And his exhortations to test
ourselves, to put ourselves in situations where our responses reveal whether our
dealings with others are unselfish and our devotion to God is pure, presuppose we
cannot simply look inside ourselves and directly observe the truth. 69 To summarize,
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for Kierkegaard, our ability to know ourselves does not obviously outstrip our ability
to know others. Thus he cannot appeal to such epistemic considerations to justify
contrasting treatment of self and other.
Turn now to the second point, namely that we have different duties and
responsibilities toward others than toward ourselves. Less comes of it than meets the
eye. To begin, having greater responsibility for ourselves does not warrant having
greater concern for ourselves. The reason is that, on a Kierkegaardian framework, the
distinction between concern for self and concern for others dissolves. Proper selfconcern involves cultivating love for God within ourselves. 70 But we express this love
for God by serving other people. 71 And we serve other people in part by helping them
cultivate loving dispositions. 72 Thus, rather than leading us to disregard others’ moral
and religious development, caring for our own development revolves around it.
Working for our own good just is working for the good of others. 73 In Kierkegaard’s
words, “To love yourself in the right way and to love the neighbor correspond
perfectly to one another; fundamentally they are one and the same thing.” 74
Our duty to respect others’ autonomy is no trump card here. True, some
people prefer to be left alone. They desire no outside guidance when it comes to how
they live their lives. But others want help living up to their ethical and religious
commitments. 75 They would like someone to point out where they fall short and even
to push them in the right direction from time to time. Letting such people “go their
own way” is consistent with scrutinizing their lives and attending to their moral and
religious development.
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Finally, even if we should concentrate more on ourselves than on others, the
real issue lies elsewhere. There is nothing terribly unsettling about Kierkegaard’s
advice that we focus more on building up love in ourselves than in others. What is
vexing is his suggestion that we do so in diametrically opposed ways, by being lenient
with others and stringent with ourselves. The particular differences in duties and
responsibilities we have canvassed do not extend so far as to justify this position.

VI. The Aristotelian Solution

There is another morally salient difference between the two cases, obvious but as yet
unmentioned. We are generally biased in our own favor. We tend to love ourselves
too much, our neighbors too little. We are overly indulgent and forgiving when
assessing ourselves, excessively strict and hard-hearted when evaluating others. 76
Does this difference in disposition license the asymmetrical treatment of self
and other Kierkegaard defends? Does it justify handling ourselves more stringently
than others and with greater suspicion? No. Relating to ourselves more harshly than
we relate to others simply represents the opposite extreme. And the opposite extreme
is equally vicious. Self-abnegation carries as many problems as selfishness and selfcenteredness. 77
Nevertheless, our propensity to over-love ourselves and under-love others may
warrant something similar, to wit the use of a strategy Aristotle defends in Book II of
the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle says that when we drift toward one vicious extreme
76
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we must drag ourselves in the contrary direction. We will thereby reach the ideal
intermediate condition. 78 Applying the idea to the matter at hand, those possessed of a
bias in their own favor do well to offset it by striving to love others more than
themselves. 79
Two comments about Aristotle’s advice are in order. First, although he
recommends aiming toward one excess and away from another, this is only the
proximate end. The final or ultimate end is a mean between the two extremes. Thus
those adhering to the Aristotelian strategy will not actually love themselves less than
others. They will work toward this state with the hope of coming to treat their
neighbors and themselves neither too stringently nor too leniently and ultimately in
more or less the same way.
Second, the specific strategy of trying to love others more than oneself is not
for everyone. Those not disposed to love themselves too much and others too little
should eschew it. It would carry them to undesirable excesses of the opposite sort.
Moreover, those who do stray in the direction of leniency toward self and severity
toward others should not necessarily follow it either. It will not always comprise the
most effective way to overcome their vices.

VII. A More Moderate Kierkegaard

I believe much of Kierkegaard’s rhetoric concerning self-love and neighbor-love is an
attempt to enact the foregoing Aristotelian strategy. He is trying to bring his readers to
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a moderate position in this arena by advocating the extreme contrary to their natural
inclinations. His recommendation that we be more rigorous with ourselves than with
others is not a statement of a moral ideal. It is a gambit or stratagem designed to
rehabilitate us from our tendency to be partial toward ourselves.
Why interpret Kierkegaard this way? First, it enables us to reconcile his
commitments regarding self-love and neighbor-love. On the one hand, he can
maintain the two loves should be symmetrical, similar in kind as well as degree. This
represents the ultimate end for Kierkegaard. On the other hand, he can hold that the
manners in which we go about loving our neighbors and loving ourselves should
diverge. We should strive to be lenient, charitable, and forgiving toward them; the
opposite toward ourselves. This position picks out the proximate end, the direction we
must head given our starting point if we wish to reach the ultimate end.
Second, Kierkegaard sometimes frames his authorship as a “corrective.” 80 He
claims it supplies a counterweight to the spirit of his age. It offers something just as
one-sided, but with the opposite emphasis. Accordingly, he warns us not to confuse
the recommendations in his texts with ordinary normative claims. 81 His remarks
supply an account of how to proceed given our present circumstances. They do not
describe what to do all else being equal.
The overt target of Kierkegaard’s corrective is Danish Lutheranism. 82 He
believes this movement has lost its way. Overcompensating for the error Luther
originally addressed, it has placed too much stock in divine grace and not enough in
striving to fulfill the law. Kierkegaard seeks to push the church back toward an
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intermediate position by reintroducing a healthy appreciation for the demands of
righteousness. 83
Although Kierkegaard only explicitly talks about providing a corrective in this
specific context, Jamie Ferreira advocates interpreting other areas of his thought in
light of the strategy. 84 I am sympathetic to Ferreira’s approach, but think we must
pursue it with caution. The temptation is to downplay any recommendation we find
displeasing on the grounds that it is just another corrective. Thus, for every statement
we wish to treat this way, we need reasons for doing so other than its disconcerting
nature. We need evidence indicating it represents only one side of the issue for
Kierkegaard.
At this juncture, a third consideration in support of my position becomes
important. Kierkegaard sometimes intimates that, for both self-love and neighborlove, the ideal is an intermediate position between leniency and stringency. It is not
one or the other depending on the object of our attention. For example, near the
beginning of Works of Love, he admits we can take self-stringency too far:

Whoever has any knowledge of people will certainly admit that just as he has often wished to
be able to move them to relinquish self-love, he has also had to wish that it were possible to
teach them to love themselves…. When the depressed person desires to be rid of life, indeed,
of himself, is this not because he is unwilling to learn earnestly and rigorously to love
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himself…? When someone self-tormentingly thinks to do God a service by torturing himself,
what is his sin except not willing to love himself in the right way?

85

The implication of this passage is that we ought to limit how severe we are
with ourselves. We must not become so thoroughly ruthless with ourselves that we
despair of self-worth altogether. A degree of forbearance is necessary.
Similarly, toward the end of Works of Love, Kierkegaard confesses it is
possible to be too easy on others. We can take mitigating explanations too far and
hide sins when we should not. Indeed, making people aware of their faults is
sometimes appropriate:

It would be a weakness, not love, to make the unloving one believe that he was right in the
evil he did; it would not be the conciliatory spirit but a treachery that would strengthen him in
the evil. No, it is of importance, it is part of love’s work, that with the help of the loving one it
becomes entirely clear to the unloving one how irresponsibly he has acted so that he deeply
feels his wrong.
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Thus the rigorousness with which Kierkegaard so often encourages us to treat
ourselves is sometimes to be directed toward others. Our interpersonal relations
should not always be marked by those three pleasant words: leniency, charity,
forgiveness.
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VIII. Are Kierkegaard’s Ethics Necessarily Radical?

The proposal of a more moderate Kierkegaard will not sit well with some readers. It
conflicts with the common thought that Kierkegaard’s ethics are necessarily radical,
and for reasons having to do with his Christianity. He must insist on the strenuousness
of the moral requirement because he has to get us to recognize how far short of the
ideal we fall. Only once we acknowledge our depravity will we repent and turn to
God in a wholehearted fashion. Only once we are shipwrecked on sin will we rest in
God’s forgiveness and grace. Thus, any attempts to “soften the blow” must be
rejected. Such interpretations, as Amy Laura Hall says, “miss and undermine the
meaning of Kierkegaard’s texts.”87
There is good textual evidence for this position. 88 But we must balance it
against other considerations. First, as noted in the previous section, there are
indications that Kierkegaard considers it possible to be too hard on ourselves.
Despairing over our self-worth is religiously problematic.
Second, the line of thought outlined above justifies harsh treatment not just of
ourselves but our neighbors as well. They too must turn to God, and we have an
obligation to assist them. Among the things we can do is to push them toward sin
consciousness. Like good maieutic teachers, we can help them see for themselves the
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ugly truth about themselves. 89 There might be many ways to proceed here. But one
promising strategy is to criticize them vociferously. Indeed, if the slightest leniency
with ourselves inhibits us from properly acknowledging our moral turpitude, anything
but harshness with others would seem unacceptable for the same reason.
The problem is that harshness is the opposite of what Kierkegaard
recommends. He urges us to be conciliatory and understanding when dealing with
others. We are to cover over their transgressions whenever we can and forgive them
whenever we cannot.
Therefore, those who read Kierkegaard as claiming that we must be
uncompromisingly strict with ourselves face a difficult choice. They must explain
away either (a) passages in which he endorses leniency with others or (b) passages in
which he embraces symmetry between self-love and neighbor-love. For reasons I
have already discussed, I find both alternatives unacceptable. Thus, I believe we
ought to back off the initial idea that Kierkegaard advocates unqualified selfstringency. That does not mean I think he wants us to be easy on ourselves. Some
rigor is doubtless necessary to prompt us to rely on God. I am merely claiming that he
sees this rigor as having limits.

IX. On “Corrective” Readings of Kierkegaard

I conclude with another potential concern about my interpretation of Kierkegaard.
Like all readings that make capital of the corrective aspect of his work, it has the
property of being unfalsifiable. It is hospitable to virtually any piece of textual
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evidence. For instance, someone might continue to press the objection raised in the
previous section by noting that Kierkegaard explicitly and repeatedly says Christian
ethics is radical, demanding, and offensive. 90 The worry is that I could dismiss such a
charge all too easily by saying these passages also form part of the corrective. They
are just another component of Kierkegaard’s strategy to ameliorate our tendency
toward self-indulgence.
Such a maneuver would no doubt be frustrating. To the degree I must rely on
it, my view limps. Now I can avoid doing so here, since driving toward the opposite
extreme of a natural tendency will always be strenuous and advocating such a tactic
will often be offensive, at least to those firmly ensconced in their ways. But the
problem has been raised and it is worth exploring precisely how much damage
unfalsifiability does.
Several points deserve mention. First, the banal: Unfalsifiable readings are not
therefore false. They also are not completely indifferent to textual evidence. A
passage counts against them if accommodating it requires introducing bizarre or ad
hoc addendums. For example, if we discovered journal entries in which Kierkegaard
said his proclamations about self-love had to be taken at face value, my view would
suffer. It would be difficult to account for such possible entries without stretching my
reading to the point of incredulity.
Finally, unfalsifiability is but one of many evaluative properties to place in the
hopper when assessing an interpretation, and its presence is not always decisive. For
instance, my account has the benefit of enabling us to see Kierkegaard’s position as
internally consistent. I need not say he holds contradictory views about self-love and
neighbor-love. Moreover, I do not have to sacrifice his central commitments
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regarding these two loves. He can still maintain that they should be symmetrical, as
the biblical injunction implies, and that we should strive to love others more than
ourselves. Moreover, the position I defend is not devoid of textual support. Several
passages are best understood as suggesting Kierkegaard pursues the Aristotelian
strategy I attribute to him. In the end, these virtues outweigh the vice of
unfalsifiability. They render defensible my way of handling the relationship between
self-love and neighbor-love in Kierkegaard’s ethics.

